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JUSTICE MURPHY AND THE WELFARE QUESTION 
Leo Weiss* 
I N 1941, an Italian law professor arrived in the United States to make his home here. Born in Russia during Czarist days, he was edu-
cated in Austria, England, and Italy, finally settling there and becoming 
a citizen. A member of the Italian bar and teacher of law at the 
Universities of Florence and Rome, he found himself in 1939 un-
wanted in his adopted homeland. He went to France, where he prac-
ticed law until coming to this country. In New York City he joined 
the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, remain-
ing in that post for five years, until he died, at the age of 44, in an 
airplane accident. His name was Alexander Pekelis. 
During his short stay in the United States, Pekelis showed himself 
to be an acute commentator on the American legal and social scene. 
His foreign training perhaps helped him to understand our legal system 
better than many American lawyers who are too deeply immersed in 
its daily operations. With insights born of a restless and inquiring 
mind and his experience in analyzing parallel machinery in other 
countries, Pekelis was able to contribute much of value to our juris-
prudence. A slim volume of his essays, put together by his friends 
after his death, testifies to that.1 
Pekelis addressed himself to the problem of what a judge can do 
when he is faced with the necessity of deciding a hard case. If the 
statute is ambiguous, the court decisions conllicting, and the logic of 
the attorney's arguments unconvincing, where can the judge tum? 
While such occasions do not arise often, the judge must be prepared 
with the proper instruments, or he may suffer mightily before finding 
an answer. Pekelis' method of approaching this dilemma he called 
" If · · d "2 we are Junspru ence. 
The basic concept of "welfare jurisprudence" can be simply stated. 
A judge faced with difficult problems of statutory interpretation should 
decide which of the alternative decisions open to him will best advance 
the interests of the society in which he lives. 
" ... our judges, who have long been asking themselves a series 
of inadequate questions about canons of construction, intents of 
the legislators, or lines of judicial authority [should] ask them-
selves ... the only question that really matters: Which course of 
,,. Member, New York Bar.-Ed. 
1 PEKBL1s, LAW AND SoCIAL ACTION, Konvitz, ed., (1950). 
2Jd. at 1-41, "The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare." 
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my action-which rule of law-is going to serve best the general 
welfare of the society I am sworn to serve?' "3 
Lest this quotation cause us to run off in the wrong direction, let 
us hear more of what Pekelis has to say. 
"Jurisprudence of welfare is no answer to the problems of our 
time. In fact, it is no answer at all, but a mode of inquiry. It is an 
invitation to learn, a suggestion as to how questions should be 
asked, a call for the growth of a systematic participation of the 
judiciary-burdened with responsibility and stripped of its pontifi-
cal robes-in the travail of society. Jurisprudence of welfare is 
no easy solution of legal and social problems .... [I]t is not an 
attempt to impose a given concept of life or to present a given 
answer to the issues before us."4 
A judge, then, rather than holding himself aloof from the affairs 
of his world, must immerse himself in those affairs. He must learn its 
realities and illusions, its ideals and purposes, its hopes and disappoint-
ments, its agreements and disagreements. Only then would he be 
capable of asking himself the "welfare question." 
To be capable of answering that question the judge must also have 
a working knowledge of the social sciences. These are the tools with 
which he can build rational conclusions, based on the gathering of 
evidence by trained investigators and theory-making by informed 
minds. Without this he is helpless, or worse, ignorant, and dangerous 
because he does not appreciate his own inadequacy to deal with these 
matters. By recognizing and understanding the forces which shape 
the society, the judge can contribute to the attainment of its objectives. 
By deciding these doubtful but important cases through answers to the 
"welfare question," the judge can influence the direction in which we 
are going and the speed with which we will arrive. This is the creative 
role judges can play. 
The vast majority of legal disputes never go beyond the trial court 
stage.5 Decisions at that level mainly involve the questions whether 
enough evidence has been brought in to prove what the plaintiff claims 
and whether the defendant has brought in enough evidence to over-
come the claim. They are concerned mostly with what happened. 
Interpretation of statutory or decisional law is questioned in only a small 
proportion of the cases. But these are the cases which can keep the 
judge awake at night. At least, those judges who recognize how diffi-
a 1a. at 8. 
4Jd. at 40. 
5 See FRANK, I.Aw .AND THE MoDBRN M= (1930, 1949 printing). 
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cult the job is that society has assigned to them will be sorely troubled. 
When a case arrives at the stately portals of the United States Supreme 
Court, it usually brings with it, either in person or by proxy, several 
eminent gentlemen. They may be legal scholars, famous lawyers of 
long experience, even judges of great skill and high repute. It is a 
pleasure to commune with these great minds, except for one thing. 
They usually disagree violently on how the case should be determined. 
This is not a new problem; it has been bothering judges for cen-
turies. What is new is the recent effort to :6.nd out just what a judge 
does under these circumstances. No court ever says that it cannot 
make up its mind among the alternatives and that it will not, therefore, 
decide the case. It always decides the case. It seldom, however, gives 
in the written opinion an accurate description of the intellectual and 
emotional processes that went into its production. 6 
In the past, for example, judges often said that the law was-it 
existed-and a careful search would reveal its hiding place. Judges 
were law-finders. The law was not the opinion of one man or another, 
regardless of his scholarship, wisdom, or official position. It was a 
reality which existed outside of men's minds and the judge's job was 
to :6.nd it. Believing in this theory, common law judges did not mind 
surprising a litigant with a novel rule of law that neither he nor his 
lawyer had ever heard of before. Since the judge had merely found 
the law, he hadn't made it; it was not new at all. All men were pre-
sumed to know the law as it was, not as the courts had said it was. 
Judges did not feel it unjust to reverse a long line of precedents with 
the remark that earlier judges had not correctly found the law.7 A one-
paragraph dissertation can hardly do justice to a legal theory that flour-
ished for centuries, but we need not dig any deeper into the matter. 
It is used here to demonstrate how a judge can shelter himself from 
blame for a decision which he feels is right, but which arouses heated 
criticism outside his courtroom. It still does not explain the mental 
operation though which he passed in order to determine the "correct" 
solution. 
6 Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process," in HALL (ed.), SELECTilD WRIT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 107-184 (1947). This was one of the first full-length 
confessions made by a judge about the inner workings of the judicial process. Because of 
this, and because Cardozo wrote it, the book has become one of the most influential works 
in American legal literature. Long before publication of this volume (1921), however, 
men like John Chipman Gray recognized the inadequacy of orthodox explanations of how 
judges decided cases. Roscoe Pound had also voiced his dissatisfaction with the conven-
tional analyses. 
7 A description of the "law-finding'' theories appears in Cohen, "The Process of 
Judicial Legislation," in LAw AND nm SoCIAL ORDER 112-147 (1933). 
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With the opening of the twentieth century the courts came up 
against a new perplexity, the tremendous growth of legislation. Statutes 
had once been used only to settle momentous issues; their appearance 
in court was an occasion judges seldom had to fear. Now, in a short 
time, every aspect of our social life became affected by the passage of 
laws. New tools were required to deal with this complication. Once 
again the courts tried to avoid blame for their decisions. When a 
law was ambiguous or. its wording confused, the judges set about the 
task of determining "legislative intent." Upon finding the "intent" 
of the legislature, the court could state that it was not interested in 
arguments over the merits of the statute. These should be addressed 
to the legislature because policy-making was a legislative function. 
The court's job was merely to determine the legislative purpose when 
that was not clear from the language of the statute.8 This bears a strik-
ing resem~lance to the earlier theory. Previously, the judges had been 
looking for the "law," now they sought "legislative intent." In both 
instances they were seekers after something that had been created by 
someone else and the courts could not be reproached for what they 
found. 
How £ind the "legislative intent"? You can't call up the presiding 
officer and ask him what the legislature meant. For one thing, the 
statute may have been passed years earlier and there may be no one 
alive who remembers the occasion. Besides, membership in a demo-
cratic legislature is a notoriously precarious way of making a living. 
The legislature of 1953 may have lost all the men of the earlier session 
who might be helpful to the judge. But the really serious obstacle is the 
theory itself. It does not look for the will of the individual members, 
it seeks the collective "intent" of the institution called the legislature. 
No individual member is competent to come into court and explain 
what the legislators meant when they passed a statute. At that point 
he becomes a private citizen, no more entitled to credence in this matter 
than any other well-informed person. Certainly, he knows no more 
about the legislative. intent than the judge does. Still the problem 
must be faced. Somehow the judge must find out what the legislature 
wanted. And over the years, American judges developed certain in-
struments which they hoped would be useful in this monumental 
undertaking. Technological progress contributed its share to this aspect 
of our lives too. 
s Two articles by Max Radin contain severe criticism of the idea that in interpreting 
statutes the court's job is to determine the legislative intent. "Statutory Interpretation," 43 
HARV. L. Rnv. 863 (1930), and "A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation," 33 CAI.IF. L. 
R:sv. 219 (1945). 
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As the twentieth century progressed, debates -and reports of state 
legislatures and the Congress became more complete and more easily 
available. They grew to be the main prop of the system designed to 
determine the legislative intent. Investigations, committee recommen-
dations, arguments on the B.oor over the merits of a bill, all combined 
to produce what became known as a bill's "legislative history." This 
material, the remarks of those who were for, those who were against, 
and those who were indifferent, could be sifted and a collective intent 
of the legislature culled from it. At least that was the theory.9 
The courts also adopted a series of well-known "canons of con-
struction." These had Latin names, their content was mysterious, and 
many judges were completely confused about what function they were 
supposed to serve. In effect, these canons amounted to presumptions 
that if the legislature said one thing, it also meant something else which 
it did not say explicitly. While this method had the advantage of never 
going outside the statute to solve the problem, it also resulted in ascrib-
ing to legislators "intent'' which they obviously never had.10 Many 
decisions show signs that these and other means of determining legis-
lative intent were used in a selective way, so that the judge's ideas on 
the substance of the legislation-its policy-were often fulfilled. At 
the same time, judges busily disclaimed the role of policy makers or 
assessors of the legislature's wisdom. They claimed merely to be giving 
effect to what the legislature wanted done. 
Does "welfare jurisprudence" allow the judge to decide cases as it 
pleases him? With this approach would he be free of all outside 
restraint, responsible only to his own notions of what is good for the 
society? Would it be impossible to draw general rules of conduct from 
judicial decisions because the next judge who heard the same facts 
might come to a different conclusion, based on his own ideas of the 
public welfare? The answer to all these questions is a clear and loud 
"No"! It is often forgotten that the problem of what role the judge is 
to play does not arise in the vast majority of cases. Only the most 
difficult problems, the ones to which no clear answer can be found in 
the statutes or the judicial opinions, arouse debate over how the judge 
is to find answers. Most of the time, legislation and court decisions 
guide the judge easily to the determination of his case, leaving him 
9 The two articles by Radin cited in note 8 are also critical of the use of ''legislative 
history" to help a judge decide problems of statutory interpretation. This follows, of course, 
from rejection of the ''legislative intent" theory, 'Since the only function of the ''legislative 
history" would be to determine the ''legislative intent." 
10 For a collection of cases in which these canons are discussed see READ Affl> MAc-
DoNALD, CAsEs AND OTHI!R MATERrALs ON LEGISLATION 786-852 (1948). 
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in no quandary unless, for some reason, he is unwilling to follow them. 
It is the exceptional case that requires the exercise of the judge's 
creative faculties.11 
Why are these exceptional cases so difficult to handle? If the stat-
ute is not clear and the court decisions give no answer, why cannot 
the judge merely decide the case one way or the other? Why will he 
be severely criticized regardless of whether he gives judgment for the 
plaintiff or the defendant? Why is it not enough merely to give an 
answer-any answer-and then refer the disappointed party to the leg-
islature for redress of grievances and change of law? After all, it is the 
legislature which sets policy, not the court. Exceptional cases are such 
precisely because they do not concern only the parties who appear in 
court. When the Supreme Court ruled that the Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen must not contract 
to destroy the rights of Negro employees,12 that decision affected every 
Negro in the United States, millions of people belonging to other 
minority racial and religious groups, thousands of employers, and hun-
dreds of labor unions. All must now conform to the rules laid down in 
that decision. Millions of others were indirectly affected because the 
structure of our society was profoundly influenced by this case. In a 
sense, every American was affected, as well as generations of citizens 
not yet born. No one today would argue that the Dred Scott decision,13 
because it returned one runaway slave to one owner, did not touch the 
rest of our population. To decide such questions as though they in-
volved only a struggle between two individuals is to bury the judicial 
head in the sands. More and more, we are coming to realize that court 
decisions cannot be made that way. 
Conflicting social interests are contending for supremacy. Which-
ever way the judge decides advances one of them at the expense of the 
other. Is it wise then to compel him to act as though the conflict did 
not exist? Or would it be preferable to supply the judge with all the 
mental and physical equipment necessary to make this decision realis-
11 This is Pekelis' view. Jerome Frank seems to feel that everyday cases which never 
go beyond the trial stage also contain important elements of judicial law-making. If this 
merely means that the judge has some discretion in dealing with the case before him, there 
is nothing to argue about. But difficult questions, involving conflicting social interests, are 
seldom finally decided at the trial level. These cases contain materials which often can be 
generally applied. The discretion which a trial judge exercises is of the type which cannot 
be transferred to other cases because it usually deals only with the facts of the case he is 
trying. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MoDERN Mnm (1930, 1949 printing) and FRANK, 
COURTS ON TRIAL (1949). 
12 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). See 
the discussion of this case on p. 549 infra. 
13 Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
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tically, let him tell us exactly how he has made it and why, then let us 
judge the decision for what it is, the resolution of interests competing 
with each other for the protection and privileges that society can 
bestow?14 How can this be done? Do any two people agree on what 
measures will serve the general welfare? And when two social interests 
conflict, can it ever be said that the society really desires that one be 
preferred over the other? 
Pekelis' reply was not a denial of these contentions. It was, rather, 
an observation coming from his shrewd insight into the American 
scene. He admitted that on a vast range of public questions there is 
no agreement concerning the general welfare. He also admitted that 
it is often not clear which of two competing interests society ought to 
favor to best achieve its goals. But he pointed out something which is 
often overlooked. 
"It is only realistic to admit that our society has reached at least 
an outward agreement on an unprecedented number of issues. To 
begin with, high infantile mortality, continuous malnutrition of 
a large percentage of the domestic population, shelter and housing 
conditions promotive of disease and juvenile delinquency, and 
even unnecessarily hazardous or degrading conditions of work have 
no open advocates today."1 is 
He went even further than that: 
"It must be noted, furthermore, that the present state of articu-
lated public opinion in the United States is such that a consid-
erable degree of unanimity may be found on a number of issues 
going much beyond the recognition of elementary needs. For 
instance, class or race supremacy is openly advocated only excep-
tionally, and hardly ever from or before the bench. There is also 
an equally considerable consensus, so far as manifested opinion is 
concerned, in regard to a minimum degree of protection due to 
unwary consumers and minor workers .... "16 
Since we are in accord on a number of issues which come before 
the courts continually, there is an area in which the judge can give 
effect to society's agreement. The "freedom of contract" which will be 
14 Pekelis did not invent this theoxy out of whole cloth. It has a long and honorable 
history, some of the greatest names in law and philosophy having contributed to its develop-
ment during the past fifty years. Pound, Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo have all subscribed 
to it in one form or another. Radin, Frank, Beutel, Landis and Morris R. Cohen have 
written prolifically about it. See CoHEN AND COHEN, RnAnmcs IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
LEcAL PmLosoPHY 439-526 (1951). 
15 PEKELIS, I.Aw AND SoCIAL ACTION 35 (1950). 
10 Id. at 36. 
548 MrcmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
protected by the courts under many circumstances will not stand when 
a man tries to use it to justify maintaining a nursery school for small 
children in an unsanitary firetrap. On that, society is agreed, and no 
court would today oppose that mutual understanding. 
Well, there is the theory, and the first question that comes to mind 
is, "Does it work?" Can judges really decide cases oy answering the 
"welfare question"? Or is this just another illusion along a road we 
seem always to be traveling in the dark? It would be foolhardy, at this 
stage of our legal development, to try answering these questions in pure 
"yes or no" terms. I would merely like to suggest that the opinions of 
Justice Frank Murphy, who sat on the United States Supreme Court 
from 1940 to 1949, indicate that such an approach is possible.17 
It is important to remember who Frank Murphy was, and who he 
was not. He did not come to the United States Supreme Court from 
cloistered academic halls; nor did he come from the rarified atmosphere 
of an important appellate court. Murphy's first judicial experience was 
in the Detroit Recorder's Court, a minor criminal tribunal. In this 
obscure position he gained a wide reputation for fairness by expertly 
handling the explosive trial of a Negro doctor accused of killing a white 
man. The victim had been a member of a mob which had surrounded 
the doctor's home and tried to frighten him into moving from the 
neighborhood.18 
After being elected Mayor of Detroit, Murphy was faced with the 
grave problems which the depression brought to this turbulent indus-
trial area. His vigorous attacks on these problems resulted in election 
to the post of Michigan's Governor. From there he went on to become 
High Commissioner of the Philippines, Attorney General of the United 
States, then Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
No ivory tower here. This is the history of a man who for many 
years had the responsibility of dealing with some of society's worst ail-
ments. No wonder, then, that a thorough appreciation of life's hardest 
realities is the most striking aspect of Justice Murphy's opinions. It 
should be no surprise either that this practical idealist found "welfare 
17 Frank, "Justice Murphy, the Goals Attempted," 59 YALE L.J. 1 (1949); Arnold, 
''Mr. Justice Murphy," 63 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1949). These two articles contain general 
appraisals of Justice Murphy's work on the Supreme Court. More specific analysis of the 
court decisions was done for a symposium in memory of the Justice which appeared in 48 
MrcH. L. R.E.v. 737 (1950). Thurgood Marshall examined and discussed the opinions which 
Justice Murphy wrote in civil rights cases and Archibald Cox dealt with the labor-case 
opinions. 
1s An interesting account of the trial of Dr. Sweet appears in STONE, CLARENCE 
DAJmow FOR THE DEFENSE, c. xiii (1941). Darrow was defense attorney in the case. A 
deadlocked jury caused release of the defendant and he was never re-tried. 
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jurisprudence" an important aid in his judicial work. Let's look at some 
of his decisions. 
Is a Union a "Legislature"? 
Controversies involving racial discrimination presented to Justice 
Murphy the clearest instance of an evil against which society had set 
its face. Here was a social interest so high on the scale of democracy's 
values that against it all competing interests must be struck down. Even 
the right of a labor union to conduct its affairs without interference by 
government could not stand when opposed by the right of a human 
being to be treated fairly no matter what the color of his skin.19 
"No statutory interpretation can erase this ugly example of 
economic cruelty against colored citizens of the United States. 
Nothing can destroy the fact that the accident of birth has been 
used as the basis to abuse individual rights by an organization 
purporting to act in conformity with its Congressional mandate."20 
In these strong terms, Justice Murphy announced his dissatisfaction 
with the opinion of Chief Justice Stone, in the famous Steele case, 
although he did agree with the result. 
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen acted as bargaining agent 
for all the employees in a particular group because it had been elected 
representative by a majority of them. Negroes were a large minority 
in that group, but were not allowed membership in the union. Just 
the same, the union proceeded to barter away the rights of the Negro 
employees in return for the railroad's promise to replace them with 
white workers. Alabama's courts found nothing illegal in this treatment 
of the Negroes, ruling that the Railway Labor Act:21 gave to the author-
ized bargaining agent complete power to enter into any kind of con-
tract. The rights of minority groups were not protected by the statute 
against invasion by the union. 22 A unanimous Supreme Court of the 
United States disagreed with this view. Chief Justice Stone expressed 
the prevailing opinion that if a federal law really gave the union such 
blanket power over all workers in the bargaining unit it would probably 
be invalid. He compared the authority given to unions by the act with 
the power of a state legislature under the Constitution. Just as the 
legislature must govern all constituents with an even hand, not favor-
ing one at the expense of another, so a union clothed with congressional 
19 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). 
20 Id. at 209. 
2144 Stat. L. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §151. 
22 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 245 Ala. 113, 16 S. (2d) 416 (1944). 
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authority must not discriminate against any of the employees whom it 
is supposed to represent. But the Chief Justice also felt that the case 
could be decided on a narrower ground. The wording of the Railway 
Labor Act seemed to him clearly to require the bargaining agent to act 
for the benefit of all the members of the group, and to prohibit sacrifice 
of the rights of some to gain advantages for others. And he capped his 
decision with a final justification. To allow such discrimination by the 
union would leave the injured minority with only one effective means 
of fighting back, the strike. Since the major purpose of the act was to 
eliminate labor disputes in the railroad industry, Congress could not 
have intended to leave open such a source of conllict. 
There is nothing in Chief Justice Stone's opinion to suggest that 
racial discrimination was a social problem in the United States in 1944. 
Its reasoning would apply as well if the complaining employees were 
red-haired men or overweight women. With this aspect of the decision, 
Justice Murphy felt compelled to express disagreement. 
"The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of 
colored citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to de-
mand the invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide 
the case and to analyze the statute solely upon the basis of legal 
niceties, while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and 
oppressive deprivation of constitutional guarantees, is to make the 
judicial function something less than it should be."23 
To Justice Murphy, any act of government which led to racial 
discrimination was unconstitutional. At the time of the Steele deci-
sion the United States was at war against enemies who professed to 
be racially superior to the rest of the people in the world. Out-
croppings of such an attitude in this country were also well known. He 
believed these were important considerations and refused to ignore the 
most controversial aspect of the case, whether the discrimination by the 
union raised special questions because it was based on race. He was 
the only one of the justices who thought so.24 
''The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic 
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any race, 
creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such discrimina-
tion to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today to permit 
2s Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 208, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). 
24 Many articles have been written for the law reviews concerning the Steele case. 
Two of the best set this case in its proper context, dealing also with other types of union 
discrimination against workers in the bargaining unit who are not union members or who 
belong to other unions. Martin, "Recent Labor Decisions," 3 NAT. B.J. 148 (1945); 
Dodd, "Discrimination by Labor Unions in Exercise of Statutory Bargaining Powers," 58 
HARv. L. REv. 448 (1945). 
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the slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it, 
to expose and condemn it wherever it appears in the course of a 
statutory interpretation."25 
Is Western Union a "Producer of Goods'? 
"Oppressive child labor in any industry is a reversion to an 
outmoded and degenerate code of economic and social behavior."26 
That statement expressed the outlook of Justice Murphy on the 
problem of child labor. It ascribed the highest value to society's efforts 
to eliminate this sore spot from its body. Five justices of the Supreme 
Court did not take the same view of the matter.27 
In the Fair Labor Standards Act,28 Congress prohibited the "ship-
ment'' in interstate commerce of "any goods ... produced in an estab-
lishment" in which a child under sixteen was employed within thirty 
days of the removal of the goods from the premises. Since this wording 
does not expressly include the actual transportation of goods, Western 
Union contended that its messengers were not protected by the statute. 
Admittedly employing children below the allowable age, the company 
claimed an exemption because it was not a "producer of goods." The 
act defined "produce" to mean "produce, manufacture, mine, handle, 
· th k " or m any o er manner wor on .... 
Justice Jackson, for the majority, agreed with Western Union. 
While finding no difficulty in holding that telegraph messages are 
"goods" within the law's meaning, he felt that Western Union was 
not a "producer" in regard to the messages and that it could not be 
reasonably said that the company "shipped" messages in interstate 
commerce. He ruled that the term "produce" applied only to those 
activities which were preliminary to placing the goods into commerce 
and that Western Union's only "handling" involved the actual trans-
portation. And he defined "ship" by resorting to "the-ordinary speech 
of the people" because Congress had left it undefined. 
Justice Murphy opened his attack by declaring, "In approaching 
the problem of whether Western Union is a producer of goods shipped 
in interstate commerce we should not be unmindful of the humani-
tarian purposes which led Congress to adopt §12(a)."29 Given the 
25 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 209, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). 
26 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 at 510, 65 S.Ct. 335 
(1945). 
27Westem Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945). 
2s 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §201. 
29Westem Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 at 510, 65 S.Ct. 335 
(1945). 
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humanitarian purposes of Congress and society's abhorrence of child 
labor, there was no justification for carving out an exception to benefit 
the telegraph company. 
" ... courts should not disregard the legislative motive in interpret-
ing and applying the statutory provisions that were adopted. If 
the existence of oppressive child labor in a particular instance falls 
within the obvious intent and spirit of §12(a), we should not be 
too meticulous and exacting in dealing with the statutory language. 
To sacrifice social gains for the sake of grammatical perfection is 
not in keeping with the high traditions of the interpretative 
process."30 
He argued that even by Justice Jackson's standard Western Union 
was a "producer" because of the work it did in preparing the messages 
for transportation. He pointed to the acceptance of the message from 
the sender, its marking, its coding, and its transformation into electrical 
impulses. For him that was sufficient "handling or working on" to make 
Western Union a "producer," even if all the work actually involved in 
the transportation were ignored. 
What about "shipment'' then? If telegraph messages are not 
"shipped" then Western Union is not subject to the act. As Justice 
Jackson put it, " ... if it is common ... to speak of shipping a telegram 
or receiving a shipment of telegrams, we do not know of it."31 But that 
wasn't good enough for Justice Murphy: 
"As a matter of linguistic purism, this conclusion is not with-
out reasonableness. But proper respect for the legislative intent 
and the interpretative process does not demand fastidious adher-
ence to linguistic purism .... If the verb actually used by Congress 
may fairly be interpreted to cover the particular situation in a 
manner not at variance with the intent and spirit of the statute, 
no sound rule of law forbids such an interpretation."32 
This split between Murphy and Jackson illustrates the elements 
which we have been discussing. Jackson looked for specific statutory 
wording, solved his problems by exact definitions of the meanings of 
words, disregarded the play of conflicting social interests involved in 
the case. Those interests were there and Jackson decided in favor of 
one against the other. But he refused to discuss it.33 Murphy discussed 
it, frankly took his stand on one side, and told why he did so. He said: 
30Ibid. 
31 Id. at 506. 
32 Id. at 512. 
33 "So far as legislative history is concerned, Justice Jackson examines it in detail for 
the majority and finds that it adds up to zero. Justice Murphy scarcely mentions it. I 
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"Such an interpretation and application ... are not only realis-
tic but are in obvious accord with the statutory policy of eliminat-
ing oppressive child labor in industries transporting goods and 
subjects of commerce across state lines .... There is nothing in the 
statute or in its legislative background to suggest that telegraph 
companies are exempt. . . . It is indisputable that the evils of op-
pressive child labor allow no distinction in favor of the employment 
of telegraph messengers of tender years."34 
Justice Jackson's opinion does not indicate his thoughts on the 
evils of child labor. His result suggests he did not think it was a serious 
enough problem to override the conllicting interest which society has 
in keeping telegraph companies operating with a minimum of hin-
drance. Had Congress specifically declared that telegraph companies 
must not employ children under 16, Justice Jackson would, of course, 
have enforced that law with vigor. But he did not believe that employ-
ment of child labor was a vile enough practice to warrant a broad 
interpretation of the unclear statute.35 From our point of view, the 
most striking thing about Justice Jackson's opinion was what he left 
out. By failing to discuss the issues which Justice Murphy squarely 
faced, Justice Jackson hid from public scrutiny, perhaps even from 
himself, the intellectual process that produced his conclusion. 
Justice Murphy declared that society's interest in eradicating child 
labor was so important that to achieve it he was willing to extend the 
word of Congress to its outermost limit. He quoted President Roose-
velt: "A self-supporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no 
justification for the existence of child labor."36 He accepted that as 
society's judgment and announced that he would go as far as was 
judicially possible to aid that worthy social purpose. 
Is a Company Town "Private Property"? 
The right of private individuals to own and control the use of their 
property is one of the most fundamental elements of our form of 
think we may properly say that Justice Jackson's brilliant presentation amply justifies the 
deliberate neglect of Justice Murphy." So states Radin in "A Case Study in Statutory 
Interpretation,'' 33 CALIF. L. REv. 219 at 225 (1945). This is a brilliant analysis of the 
Western Union case, sharply critical of the reasoning process used by Justice Jackson in 
coming to his conclusion. 
34 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 at 512, 65 S.Ct. 335 
(1945). 
35 Cox, "Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes," 60 HARv. L. REv. 
370 (1947). This article is also severely critical of Justice Jackson's opinion in the Western 
Union case. Its keynote, however, is the court of appeals decision in the same case which 
was written by Judge Hand. It was reversed by the Supreme Court, Justice Murphy's 
dissenting opinion being much closer to Judge Hand's view of the case. 
36 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 at 510, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945). 
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society. There have been times when no other ideal was more jealously 
guarded and more zealously protected by the government. Today, we 
recognize that individual use of private property must accommodate 
itself somewhat to our other social needs. The big question is, how far 
must that accommodation go? In coming years, lawmakers, judges, 
and private citizens will all have to make up their minds on how to 
answer that question. This kind of problem can rarely be handled with 
abstractions. It arises in concrete situations, requiring difficult decisions 
on borderline issues. Let's examine a specific case.37 
A small North Carolina village is owned entirely by the company 
which operates four cotton mills there. The workers' homes are on 
company property, as are the stores, the post office, the school, theatre, 
and the one meeting hall. The hall is operated by a fraternal organiza-
tion, to which it was given by the cotton mill. Church socials have been 
held there, Ladies' Aid Society meetings, the school has had a Christmas 
party there, and the company used it for a safety-training course given 
for its employees. Anyone who wants to use the meeting room applies 
to the fraternal organization for permission, and there is no evidence 
that this permission was ever refused. Then, along comes a CIO union, 
campaigning among the mill workers in anticipation of a coming Na-
tional Labor Relations Board election. Wanting to hold a meeting, the 
union asks the fraternal organization for use of its hall and is given the 
necessary permission. When the employer hears about this he com-
plains to the fraternal organization and rescinds the permit which the 
union has already obtained. The National Labor Relations Act:38 guar-
antees employees the right to engage in concerted activities without 
interference by their employer. Is this the kind of interference which 
amounts to an unfair labor practice? 
Justice Murphy had no hesitation in saying "yes" when the case 
came before the Supreme Court. He declared: "It is not 'every inter-
ference with property rights that is within the Fifth Amendment. . . . 
Inconvenience, or even some dislocation of property rights, may be 
necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining.' "39 
Two interests were involved here, the employer's right to use his 
private property as he saw fit, and the employees' right to organize for 
collective bargaining. Both interests could not be left standing; one 
must retire in favor of the other. In the opinion of the majority, as 
described by Justice Murphy, the employees' rights took precedence. 
37NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 69 S.Ct. 541 (1949). 
ss49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141. 
B9NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 at 232, 69 S.Ct. 541 (1949). 
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That meant the employer could not deny to the union use of a 
hall which was freely available to all other organizations. The union 
must be treated on the same basis as everyone else, no better but no 
worse. In coming to this conclusion Justice Murphy, as always, was 
keenly aware of the practical aspects of the situation. He said: 
" ... union organization in a company town must depend, even 
more than usual, on a hands-off attitude on the part of manage-
ment. And it is clear that one of management's chief weapons, in 
attempting to stifle organization, is the denial of a place to meet. 
We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill 
town with the vast metropolitan centers where a number of halls 
are available within easy reach of prospective union members. We 
would be ignoring the obvious were we to hold that a common 
meeting place in a company town is not an important part of the 
company's business."40 
Justice Reed did not look at the matter in that light at all. With Chief 
Justice Vinson, he dissented from the majority view, believing that the 
NLRB could not compel the employer to make his meeting hall avail-
able to the union. 
The Supreme Court had already held that an employer could. be 
required to let a union distribute leaflets on his plant property. That 
was different, Justice Reed thought, from requiring him to devote 
property that had no connection with his mill operations-the meeting 
hall-to the union's use. He agreed that under certain circumstances 
an employer might have to let the union use his plant for campaigning. 
But he could not see how other property belonging to the employer 
could be forced to such use. He said: 
"Employment in a business enterprise gives an employee no 
rights in the employer's other property, disconnected from that 
enterprise. As to such property, the employer stands on the same 
footing as any other property owner."41 
He went on: 
"Employment furnishes no basis for employee rights to the 
control of property for union organization when the property is not 
a part of the premises of the employer, used in his business. . . . 
Labor unions do not have the same right to utilize the property of 
an employer not directly a part of the employment facilities, that 
an employer has .... To require the employer to allow labor union 
meetings in or on property entirely disconnected in space and use 
4o Id. at 229. 
41 Id. at 241. 
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from the business of the employer and employees is too extrava-
gant an extension of the meaning of the Act for me to believe it is 
within its language or the purpose of Congress."42 
Here too the question is squarely faced. One does not lightly set 
aside the rights of private property, hallowed by a centuries-old tradi-
tion, merely to make the job of union organizing an easier one. So 
well-known is society's interest in the preservation of property that only 
the strongest considerations can persuade a retreat from protection of 
that interest. To Justice Reed, the usefulness of labor unions to society, 
the need of employees to have government protection in their collective 
bargaining activities, do not yet commend themselves as interests worthy 
of the strong protective measures.approved by a majority of the Court. 
As between "due process" and section 7 of the Wagner Act, it is collec-
tive bargaining which must take a back seat.43 
Is a Miner a "Government Employee"? 
Out of the tangled web which is the case of United States v. United 
Mine Workers44 comes more evidence of Justice Murphy's desire to 
face legal issues without hiding behind a protective covering of abstract 
legalisms.45 When John L. Lewis and the soft coal miners threatened 
to strike during 1946, the Department of Justice went into the federal 
district court in Washington, D.C. and asked for an injunction. The 
mines were then in the hands of the United States Government, having 
been seized by the President under the authority of the War Labor 
Disputes Act.46 Without notice to the union, the court granted a tem-
porary restraining order lasting nine days and directed that a hearing 
be held at that time to determine whether a temporary injunction should 
be issued. Before the hearing could be held, the miners walked out. 
Lewis and the union were both tried for contempt, found guilty by 
Judge Goldsborough, who had issued the original restraining order, and 
fined $10,000 and $3,500,000, respectively.47 When the case came 
before the Supreme Court, the nine justices produced five full-dress 
opinions and a short statement by Justice Jackson.48 The judgment of 
42 Id. at 244. 
43 A good discussion of the legal aspects of this case appears in 37 CAI.II'. L. RBv. 144 
(1949). 
44 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947). 
45 A sober and complete discussion of this controversial case is found in a comment 
in 45 l\1rnH. L. RBv. 469 (1947). 
46 57 Stat. L. 163 (1943). Popularly known as the Smith-Connally Act, it expired 
with the other war powers which Congress gave the President during World War II. 
47 United States v. United Mine Workers, (D.C. D.C. 1946) 70 F. Supp. 42. 
48 Chief Justice Vinson delivered the majority opinion, in which he was joined by 
Justices Reed and Burton. Justice Jackson also approved the majority opinion, except for 
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the district court was upheld, the Lewis fine was approved and the 
union was given a chance to get back $2,800,000 by complying with 
the provisions of the restraining order. 
Only two of the many questions discussed in these opinions are 
relevant to this paper. Chief Justice Vinson (who wrote the main 
opinion in the case) held that the miners were government employees 
because the mines had been seized by the President and were being 
operated by a representative of the Secretary of the Interior. Since 
they were goverrnent employees, the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction 
Act49 did not apply and the restraining order was properly issued. 
Vinson also said, however, that even if the injunction were invalid-
even if it should not have been granted-the union was under an obli-
gation to obey it until the order was reversed by a higher court. The 
proper procedure, he ruled, when a party objects to the terms of an 
injunction issued against him, is to appeal the matter. The order must 
be complied with until set aside. 
These two questions Justice Murphy faced with typical vigor. He 
concluded that the miners were not actually government employees 
and that an invalid court order need not be obeyed in this kind of labor 
dispute. He declared: "In my opinion, the miners remained private 
employees despite the temporary gloss of Government possession and 
operation of the mines; they bear no resemblance whatever to employ-
ees of the executive departments, the independent agencies and the 
other branches of the Government."50 
The President had seized the mines by executive order and directed 
the Secretary of the Interior to operate them. This was done through 
the appointment of a naval officer, Captain Collisson, as Administrator. 
No other change was made in the operations of the mining companies. 
Employees were paid by the mine operators, not by the government. 
Deductions from the miners' pay were those of private employees, not 
government workers. Production control and supervision of employees 
remained in the hands of the owners. Profits resulting from the opera-
tions went into the pockets of the owners, and taxes were paid just as 
though the mines were in private hands. There were also strong indi-
cations that the government did not consider itself the owner of the 
mines. When John L. Lewis, the union president, tried to negotiate 
a change in working conditions with the Secretary of the Interior, he 
one point. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with some of the 
reasoning. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice 
Murphy dissented. Justice Rutledge also dissented and wrote a separate opinion. 
49 47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §101. 
50 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 at 337, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947). 
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was told that such talks should be carried on with the mine operators. 
In making that suggestion, the secretary recognized his own lack of 
power to bargain over a new collective agreement, and seemingly ad-
mitted that the government did not really own the mines. 
All of this was proof enough to Justice Murphy that the miners 
should not be treated the way Civil Service employees would be treated 
under the same circumstances. He said, "It cannot be denied that this 
case is one growing out of a labor dispute between the private coal op-
erators and the private miners. That is a matter of common knowl-
edge. . . . [The] strikes and labor disturbances grew out of the relations 
between the operators and the miners."51 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, according to Justice Murphy, was de-
signed to take from the federal courts the power to interfere in private 
labor disputes. Whether the miners were or were not government 
employees made no difference; the only question was whether the 
"labor dispute" was a private one. If the controversy was between pri-
vate parties, then not even the fact that the federal government had 
asked for the injunction could overcome the Norris-LaGuardia prohi-
bition. Justice Murphy pointed out that the wording of the statute and 
the history of the evils which it sought to curb indicated a congressional 
desire that the federal courts stay out of private labor disputes. There 
was no exemption for those private controversies in which the govern-
ment had, for one reason or another, stepped in to ask the restraint. Not 
even the War Labor Disputes Act, under which the coal mines were 
seized, suggested in any way that the President would be able to get 
an injunction against a strike. Having held that the restraining order 
should not have been issued, Justice Murphy was faced with the solid 
fact that it had been issued. Should the union have obeyed it until 
the matter could be appealed? 
The majority, by Chief Justice Vinson, ruled that the order should 
have been obeyed even if it was improperly granted. The Chief Justice 
held that although the order might have been controversial it was not 
so "frivolous" that no sensible judge could have issued it. Although 
there were grounds upon which the order could have been denied, there 
were also grounds upon which it could have been granted. The parties 
were obligated to respect the judge's decision until reviewed by a higher 
court. Justice Murphy disagreed. 
''The issuance of such [ temporary restraining] orders prior to 
the adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had a long and tortured 
51 Id. at 336-337. 
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history. Time and again strikes were broken merely by the issu-
ance of a temporary restraining order, purporting to maintain the 
status quo. Because of the highly fluid character of labor disputes, 
the delay involved in testing an order of that nature often resulted 
in neutralizing the rights of employees to strike and picket."52 
Since this was the experience which had persuaded Congress to 
take from the federal courts the power to grant injunctions in labor 
disputes, then Justice Murphy believed that the Supreme Court should 
not allow the evil to persist by requiring the union to obey the order 
pending appeal. 
" ... to compel one to obey a void restraining order in a case in-
volving a labor dispute and to require that it be tested on appeal 
is to sanction the use of the restraining order to break strikes-
which was precisely what Congress wanted to avoid."53 
Is a Plant Guard a "Soldier"? 
Soldiers as such do not belong to labor unions and no government 
would countenance the unionization of its military forces. Loyalty to 
a labor organization is believed to be incompatible with that complete 
devotion to a soldier's duty which is expected of every man in the 
armed forces, as well as with the complete and unquestioned obedience 
that a soldier must accord his superior officers. 
During wartime, the production of materials for the armed services 
is mainly a military activity and the civilians who participate in it are 
carefully supervised by representatives of the military forces. This is 
true not only of the manufacture of guns, tanks and ammunition, but 
of uniforms, iodine, and typewriters. These ordinarily civilian tasks 
take on a military flavor, are given the privileges and priorities of 
"defense work," and are often protected in much the same way from 
much the same dangers. 
Plant protection during World War II started out as a job for the 
military police, but its tremendous expansion made it undesirable to 
devote a large military force to a responsibility which could effectively 
1,2 Id. at 340. 
53Jd. at 341. In full agreement with this thesis is Watt, "The Divine Right of Gov-
ernment by Judiciary," 14 Umv. Cm. L. R.Bv. 409 (1947). Disheartened by the result of 
the Mine Workers case, Watt predicted disastrous consequences for the labor movement. 
Actually, none of the damage which he expected American unions to sustain has material-
ized. He feared that the government would now be able to break any strike by seizing the 
company and going after an injunction in the federal courts. Passage of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, with its "national emergency" provisions, has changed the picture. The War Labor 
Disputes Act has expired. With its decision in the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court 
seems to have dispelled any possibility of Watt's dire expectations being fulfilled. 
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be met by civilian watchmen. Still, the military authorities wanted to 
have a measure of control over these civilian guards. They wanted to 
be able to reject job applicants on the basis of military considerations, 
wanted to inflict punishment for dangerous infractions of the rules, and 
wanted to have general supervision over the way these guard forces 
operated. The answer was "militarized plant guards/' a force of civil-
ians headed by a military officer. These men constituted an auxiliary 
to the regular military police. They wore uniforms supplied by the 
company (not army uniforms), swore to uphold the United States 
Constitution, and agreed to subject themselves to certain types of mili-
tary discipline. 54 At the time this system was introduced, intensive 
unionization campaigns were going on in war industries, and employers 
found that their guards were joining labor organizations. The National 
Labor Relations Board saw no objection to this and certified more than 
a hundred such bargaining units during the war years.55 Protests were 
submitted by many employers and the question was brought to the 
Supreme Court for solution. 
The opposition to allowing these guards to join unions arose from 
the feeling that they should be treated like soldiers. Their responsi-
bility to protect war factories was vital to the public welfare, and any 
possibility of conflicting loyalties should not be permitted to develop. 
In ruling that an employer need not bargain with a union of militarized 
guards, the court of appeals declared: 
"Nothmg should be permitted which will interfere in any 
degree or to any extent with the obligation which these guards have 
with the military. Membership in a union with the right to bar-
gain might, in fact is likely to, do that very thing. To so state is 
not to cast any reHection upon the patriotism of the guard mem-
bers. It is merely a recognition of that which is a matter of com-
mon knowledge."56 
While this decision may not impugn the patriotism of the guards, 
what of the patriotism of the union? The judge has set up the obliga-
tions of union membership against the requirements of national secur-
ity and has found the two incompatible. He finds that it would be 
dangerous for a nation at war to allow the men guarding its military 
factories to join a labor union for the purpose of negotiating working 
54War Department Circular No. 15, dated March 17, 1943, governed the organiza-
tion of militarized plant guard units, their discipline, obligations, relations to employers and 
to unions. Its language clearly contemplated that these men would be permitted to join 
unions in accordance with the National Labor Relations Act, if they so desired. 
55 See NLRB, EIGHTH AmroAL REPORT 57 (1943). 
56 NLRB v. Atkins & Co., (7th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 730 at 742. 
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conditions with their employers. He does not think the United States 
ought to take this chance, merely on the possibility that the union might 
turn out to be a responsible institution that would conform its activities 
to the national interest in winning the war. 
Three members of the Supreme Court were so impressed with this 
argument that they dissented from the majority decision, writing no 
opinion of their own, but citing the lower court's views.57 Justice 
Murphy wrote the majority opinion, explaining his refusal to upset the 
NLRB order by saying: 
"Here we have the Board's considered and consistent judgment 
that militarized plant guards may safely be permitted to join unions 
and bargain collectively and that their military duties and obliga-
tions do not suffer thereby .... This policy of the Board, moreover, 
has been confirmed by experience .... Under such circumstances, 
it would be folly on our part to disregard or upset the policy the 
Board has applied in this case."58 
Justice Murphy did not think the interests of the United States 
would necessarily be disregarded by labor unions in pursuit of their 
own interests. He refused to set the requirements of national security 
in opposition to the interests of the guards in collective bargaining. 
Both could exist side by side. Both could be recognized by the govern-
ment. At least until the union had shown a lack of self-restraint in 
bargaining for the guards, there was no reason to stamp it irrevocably 
with the mark of irresponsibility. He said: 
'We cannot assume, moreover, that labor organizations will 
make demands upon plant guard members or extract concessions 
from employers so as to decrease the loyalty and efficiency of the 
guards in performance of their obligations to the employers. There 
is always that possibility, but it does not qualify as a legal basis for 
taking away from the guards all their statutory rights. In other 
words, unionism and collective bargaining are capable of adjust-
ments to accommodate the special functions of plant guards."59 
As far as loyalty to the employer is concerned, Justice Murphy 
noted: 
"In guarding the plant and personnel against physical danger, 
they represent the management's legitimate interest in plant pro-
tection. But that function is not necessarily inconsistent with 
organizing and bargaining with the employer in matters affecting 
57NLRB v. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265 (1947). 
i;s Id. at 414-415. 
59 Id. at 405. 
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their own wages, hours, and working conditions. They do not lose 
the right to serve themselves in these respects merely because in 
other respects they represent a separate and independent interest 
of management."60 
There is an important lesson to be learned from these provocative 
cases. Every decision caused a split in the Supreme Court. None of 
the justices stood in the way of an obvious and compelling solution. 
Rather, some of them acted as though they had no place to turn. In 
this type of situation "welfare" jurisprudence can be most helpful. The 
cases had common characteristics that made them especially appropriate 
for the "welfare" approach. Each involved a controversial statute which 
announced important changes in social policy. In every case there 
were disputes as to the meaning of language and serious doubts about 
how the statute should be applied. There were also important inter-
ests, both public and private, on each side, vying for supremacy in the 
society's scale of values. Faced with such problems, perhaps the judge 
has nowhere to go but to his own ideas of what is good for the gen-
eral welfare. "Assuming that the pertinent legislation does not provide 
clear, unequivocal answers to the questions raised in the litigation, the 
judge is bound to be impressed by the private and public interests which 
are ranged against each other.61 
The Railway Case. Chief Justice Stone gave preference in the 
Steele case62 t9 the rule that a statutory bargaining agent must treat all 
workers in the unit with at least a reasonable amount of equality. Jus-
tice Murphy thought it more important to bar government approval of 
any act which injures a man because of the color of his skin. Both 
judges were aware of the often-expressed public interest in allowing 
labor unions to develop unhindered as agencies for collective bargain-
ing. Neither thought that could stand as a reason for allowing the 
Railroad Brotherhood to continue its discriminatory practices. Other 
interests were present also. The Railway Labor Act gave the majority 
of workers in a bargaining unit great power over the dissenting minor-
ity. Here, the majority took advantage of that legislative policy to re-
serve for itself the jobs then held by the minority. What is wrong with 
that? Nothing, said the Supreme Court of Alabama; but the United 
States Supreme Court disagreed. 
The railroads also had a vital interest in the outcome. In the role 
of employers, they were accustomed to dealing with the union as bar-
60 Id. at 404. 
61 See Patterson, "Pound's Theory of Social Interests," in lNTBRPRETATIONS OF MoD-
ERN LEGAL PmLosoPHIES, Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound (Sayre, ed.) 558-573 (1947). 
62 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1945). 
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gaining agent for the employees. To do so effectively, the contracts 
executed by the union must stand up in court. If individual employees 
can go behind their union's authority and question the validity of these 
agreements, the employer becomes insecure; he does not know which 
contract will be upheld and which struck down. Again, the Court did 
not think this a good enough reason to sanction the discriminatory 
practices. Several interests were involved, each had received the ap-
proval of society in one form or another, yet all could not be given full 
effect at the same time. Some would have to be sacrificed so that the 
more important ones could be left standing. That is exactly what was 
done. 
The Western Union Case. A telegraph company is a public utility, 
one of those corporations whose activities, while closely regulated by 
federal and state governments, have long been recognized as having a 
special value to society. That public utility interest was present in the 
Western Union case, 63 together with the undeniable desire of society 
to stamp out oppressive child labor. Justice Murphy explicitly recog-
nized this conflict and took his stand in favor of eliminating child labor. 
Justice Jackson refused to say that any such conflict existed, but since 
he decided in favor of Western Union, the result was exactly the same. 
If he had followed Pekelis' prescription, he would have talked about 
the social utility of telegraph companies, rather than about the defini-
tions in Webster's dictionary. We would then have had a more states-
manlike exposition of why he decided the case as he did. As it is, his 
opinion contributes little to the literature of legal method, jurispru-
dence, or sociology. 64 
The Company Town Case. When both the majority and dissenting 
justices recognize the existence of competing interests and flatly oppose 
each other because they differ over which interest is more important, 
the decision is most enlightening. That is what happened in the Stowe 
Spinning Company case. 65 Justice Murphy held that private property 
must adjust itself to the necessities of collective bargaining. Justice 
Reed agreed, but he did not think the adjustment need go so far. He 
believed that an employer's control over his plant property could be 
modified to the extent of compelling him to allow distribution of union 
literature on the premises. He refused to go along, how~ver, with the 
63 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945). 
64 See Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930), and "A Case 
Study in Statutory Interpretation," 33 CA.I.IF. L. REv. 219 (1945), and Cox, "Judge 
Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes," 60 HARv. L. REv. 370 (1947). 
as NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 69 S.Ct. 541 (1949). 
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next step, forcing the employer to rent his meeting hall to the union. 
The public interest in collective bargaining was strong enough to war-
rant the .first, but not strong enough to justify the second. 
The high rating on society's scale of values which Justice Murphy 
gave to collective bargaining, ·coupled with the fact that the only avail~ 
able meeting place was employer-owned, resulted in a decision favoring 
the union. A lesser respect for collective bargaining and an indiffer-
ence to the fact that the company town had only one meeting hall, 
resulted in Justice Reed's decision favoring private property rights. 
The Mine Workers Case. An instance when society has two con-
Hicting interests it would like to protect, but cannot give them both free 
play, is illustrated in the John L. Lewis case.66 Our devotion to free 
collective bargaining unhampered by government interference or com-
pulsion, often calls forth long and impassioned testimonials. So does 
the need for governmental power to end nationwide strikes which 
endanger our economy. Sometimes the speaker pays homage to both 
ideals in the same speech. But it is not always possible to be loyal to 
both concepts. The Mine Workers case separated the sheep from the 
goats. Justices of the United States Supreme Court were compelled 
to make up their minds which aspect of public policy they thought 
more important. The majority declared its unwillingness to leave the 
federal government without a weapon to prevent strikes which created 
a national emergency.67 Justice Murphy saw no warrant for govern-
ment intervention in a private controversy between an employer and 
his employees. Congress' declaration in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, that 
federal courts must not issue injunctions in private labor disputes, 
seemed to him the last word on the subject. Nothing had happened 
since passage of the act to persuade him that the evils at which it was 
aimed were no longer dangerous. Nor had anything happened to 
persuade him that strikes such as the coal miners' necessitated special 
treatment by the Supreme Court. 
The Plant Guard Case. It is sometimes possible for the courts to 
give effective recognition to each of two competing vital interests with-
out impinging upon either. During World War II, many judges and 
other public officials seemed to feel that militarized plant guards could 
not be allowed to organize unions without endangering our national 
66 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947). 
67 Careful analysis of the facts has convinced two writers that the 1946 coal strike 
did not constitute a national emergency in an economic or military sense. Bernstein and 
Lovell, "Are Coal Strikes National Emergencies?" 6 INnusTRIAL & LABon RELATIONS Rllv. 
352 (1953). 
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security. Justice Murphy recognized the existence of two interests, but 
refused to concede that they could not live peacefully side by side. 68 
Had a clear showing been made that our war efforts were being im-
peded by unions of guards the practice would undoubtedly have been 
ended immediately. 
But the mere articulation of two different interests does not neces-
sarily mean that they are incompatible. They may exist side by side 
with no trouble at all. The federal government has many offices in 
Chicago and its representatives function daily there without interfering 
with the municipal authorities or the state government of Illinois. 
Rarely is there a dispute and even rarer are the occasions when one 
governmental unit must bow to the other. This kind of side-by-side 
accommodation is not always possible. The right of Negroes to fair 
treatment could not exist together with the right of white workers to 
take their jobs away from them. The right of Western Union to use 
children in its operations excludes governmental prohibition of this 
kind of child labor. The right of employees to organize a union can-
not be effective if an employer can bar union meetings in a company-
owned town. Society's interest in keeping government out of private 
labor disputes is not served if courts can prohibit strikes against employ-
ers chosen by the president or the attorney general. 
Having reached this point, it will, perhaps, now be easier to tell 
whether Pekelis' suggested guide for the perplexed judge can be of any 
use. I think it can. I believe that examination of these few cases has 
demonstrated that Justice Murphy often used the "welfare question" 
as an aid in deciding the hard problems that came before him. Along 
the way, we found other judges who did exactly the same thing. We 
also saw judges who refused this fruitful approach and insisted on look-
ing to the canons of construction, the dictionary, and other profitless 
sources for help. These men also have much to teach, for while they 
disclaim loudly any intention to put their own views of social problems 
into effect, it is usually difficult to tell that they have not done so. I will 
agree that they often don't talk about it, but I wonder whether their 
silence actually means that these considerations have not influenced 
their decisions. I doubt it. 
Their silence means that it is harder for critics to grapple with them 
because of the difficulty in pinning down the real reason for the deci-
sion. When a judge says that he is construing a statute narrowly be-
cause it provides benefits for elderly ladies and he does not think the 
68 NLRB v. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265 (1947). 
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government should provide such benefits, we know where he stands and 
what sort of strong statutory language will persuade him that he must 
accede to the legislative desire. But when he says the legislature never 
really intended to provide such benefits, and he leans on the presence 
or absence of commas to ground his conclusion, he becomes much 
harder to deal with. Should the legislature then change the punctua-
tion to suit him, he might still £ind other trifles to prevent attainment of 
the social objective he opposes. 
When controversial social issues come to court it is not the judge 
who frankly takes his stand on one side or the other whom we must 
fear. We can deal with him easily. That is the function of the legis-
lature and of public opinion. It is the judge who decides cases in the 
dark, not knowing or not discussing the vital aspects of the problems 
before him, that we must watch out for. He can do as he pleases; for 
we cannot intelligently evaluate his judicial work unless we £ind out 
what he really thinks. And if he doesn't tell us, how can we know what 
he really thinks? We can only surmise from the practical effects of his 
decisions. 
Fortunately, many judges now realize that they must themselves 
£ind out why they decide cases as they do, and that they must tell about 
it in their written opinions. Our judiciary has no more room for medi-
cine men, with their mysterious incantations and supernatural wisdom. 
Court decisions are today often based on knowledge of sociology, psy-
chology, economics and other social sciences. There is also greater effort 
to express the philosophical bases of our way of life, and to conform 
judicial decisions to them. As the judge increases his use of these tools, 
he finds it harder not to consider the social consequences of the deci-
sions he must make. Acceptance of his role as referee among the com-
peting claims of highly-valued social interests will lead him to accept-
ance of the broader "welfare" approach to the judicial task. It is an 
approach which comes highly recommended and promises to give the 
courts an important share in the future growth of our society. 
